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Pain and Suffering Damages:
A Move Toward More Precision
And Accuracy
Abbott v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
197 Neb. 11, 246 N.W.2d 647 (1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been held that an award of damages for loss or im-
pairment of future earning capacity should be reduced to its present
value.' There has, however, been a split of authority as to whether
damages for future pain and suffering should also be discounted
to present value.- In Nebraska, it has been recognized that al-
though there is no mathematical formula for translating pain and
suffering into terms of dollars and cents, damages are nonetheless
allowable.3 However, there has been considerable controversy in
Nebraska as to whether these damages should be discounted to pres-
ent value. Originally, cases dealing with the problem in Nebraska
held that there should be no present value reduction for such dam-
1. Accord, Lake v. Southwick, 188 Neb. 533, 198 N.W.2d 319 (1972);
Borcherding v. Eklund, 156 Neb. 196, 55 N.W.2d 643 (1952); Russell
v. City of Wildwood, 428 F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1970); Stewart v. Atlantic
Gulf & Pac. Co., 9 F. Supp. 344 (D.C.S.D. Fla. 1934); Florida Cent.
& P.R.R. v. Burney, 98 Ga. 1, 26 S.E. 730 (1895); McCray v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 12 Ill. App. 2d 425, 139 N.E.2d 817 (1957); Von Tersch v.
Ahrendsen, 251 Iowa 115, 99 N.W.2d 287 (1959); Williams v. Clarke
County, 143 Iowa 328, 120 N.W. 306 (1909); Rigley v. Pryor, 290 Mo.
10, 233 S.W. 828 (1921); Daughtry v. Cline, 224 N.C. 381, 30 S.E.2d
322 (1944); Maus v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R., 165 Ohio
St. 281, 135 N.E.2d 253 (1956); McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285 Pa. 561,
132 A. 810 (1926); Wentz v. T.E. Connolly, Inc., 45 Wash. 2d 127, 273
P.2d 485 (1954). See also, C. MCCORmICK, DAMAGES § 86 (1935); RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 924(d) (1939); 22 Am. Ju. 2d Damages § 96
(1965); Annot., 77 A.L.R. 1439 (1932); Annot., 154 A.L.RL 796 (1945).
2. See 22 Am. Jui. 2d Damages § 108 (1965); Annot., 28 A.L.R. 1177
(1924); Annot., 77 A.L.R. 1439, 1451 (1932); Annot., 154 A.L.R. 796,
801 (1945).
3. Zawada v. Anderson, 181 Neb. 467, 474, 149 N.W.2d 329, 334 (1967);
Thorpe v. Zwonechek, 177 Neb. 504, 515, 129 N.W.2d 483, 490 (1964);
Hert v. City Beverage Co., 167 Neb. 557, 563, 94 N.W.2d 27, 31 (1959).
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ages.4 However, in Abbott v. Northwestem Bell Telephone Co.5 the
Nebraska Supreme Court made it quite clear that future pain ana
suffering damages will now, like damages for loss or impairment
of future earning capacity, be reduced to their present cash value.6
In so holding, Nebraska joins a small minority of states which re-
quire the present value reduction for future pain and suffering
damages.7 The decision seems to indicate a fear on the court's part
that unless the discount is made, the defendant is unduly and im-
properly penalized. This appears to be based on the belief that
he is being required to pay a sum worth more' today than the
amount computed by the jury as necessary to fully compensate the
plaintiff as the loss occurs in the future. For this reason, it is
thought that the plaintiff is being overcompensated. This reasoning
raises an interesting question. If the court is concerned with
awarding the most precise and accurate judgment possible for pain
and suffering damages, should it not require the jury to consider
future inflation and prejudgment interest along with the earning
power of money? If the court's goal is to precisely and accurately
award the plaintiff no more and certainly no less than that to which
he is rightfully entitled, it would seem only logical that the jury
be so instructed. It would clearly be more equitable if the factors
of inflation and prejudgment interest were given as much weight
and consideration as the earning power of money when pain and
suffering damages are awarded.
The purpose of this note will be to examine the conflict as to
whether future pain and suffering damages should be reduced to
present cash value. Additionally, it will explore the possibility of
having Nebraska courts instruct their juries to give consideration
not only to the earning power of money but also the equally impor-
tant factors of future inflation and prejudgment interest when
awarding pain and suffering damages.
II. THE FACTS
On August 24, 1970, the car which the plaintiff, Mr. George W.
Abbott, was driving was struck in the rear by a motor vehicle
4. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Candler, 283 F. 881, 884-85 (8th Cir. 1922);
Culver v. Union Pac. R.R., 112 Neb. 441, 453, 199 N.W. 794, 798-99
(1924); Kepler v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 111 Neb. 273, 287, 196
N.W. 161, 166-67 (1923).
5. 197 Neb. 11, 246 N.W.2d 647 (1976).
6. Id. at 16, 246 N.W.2d at 650.
7. Gallagher v. Monroe, 222 Mich. 202, 206, 192 N.W. 609, 610 (1923); Rig-
ley v. Pryor, 290 Mo. 10, 24-26, 233 S.W. 828, 832 (1921); Moss v. South-
ern Ry., 2 N.C. App. 50, 57, 162 S.E.2d 633, 638 (1968); Fulsome v.
Concord, 46 Vt. 135, 142 (1872).
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owned by the defendant, Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., and
driven by one of its employees. 8 Mr. Abbott brought an action for
personal injury and the jury returned a verdict in his favor.9 He
then appealed the verdict and assigned as error in one of his three
counts that the court erred in giving instruction number eleven
which directed the jury to reduce to present worth any award for
future pain and suffering. 10 Instruction number eleven to the jury
was in part as follows:
In computing the damages arising in the future, if any, because of
injuries, you must not simply multiply the damages by the length
of time you have found they will continue or by the number of
years you have found that the plaintiff is likely to live. Instead,
you must determine their present cash value."
The only future damages claimed by Mr. Abbott were for pain and
suffering relating to his claim of permanent injury.' 2 Mr. Abbott
cited Chicago & N.W. Railway v. Candler,'8 Kepler v. Chicago, St.
P., M. & 0. Railway,14 and Culver v. Union Pacific Railroad, 5 for
authority that the future pain and suffering damages should not be
reduced to present value.' 6 The Nebraska Supreme Court conceded
that it had vacillated on the issue over the years' 7 but concluded
on the basis of the more recent cases of Wolfe v. Mendel,' Zawada
v. Anderson,9 and Oberhelman v. Blount20 that future damages for
pain and suffering should be discounted to present value.2 1 The
court agreed that the utility of the rule was arguable, but it felt
that it was a rule everybody could live with if it was certain.
22
III. THE CONFLICT
In 1922, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Chicago
& N.W. Railway v. Candler,23 a Nebraska personal injury case, held
that a damage award for future pain and suffering was not to be
8. 197 Neb. at 12, 246 N.W.2d at 648.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 13, 246 N.W.2d at 648.
11. Id. at 16, 246 N.W.2d at 650.
12. Id.
13. 283 F. 881 (8th Cir. 1922).
14. 111 Neb. 273, 196 N.W. 161 (1923).
15. 112 Neb. 441, 199 N.W. 794 (1924).
16. 197 Neb. at 16, 246 N.W.2d at 650.
17. Id.
18. 165 Neb. 16, 84 N.W.2d 109 (1957).
19. 181 Neb. 467, 149 N.W.2d 329 (1967).
20. 196 Neb. 42, 241 N.W.2d 355 (1976).
21. 197 Neb. at 16, 246 N.W.2d at 650.
22. Id.
23. 283 F. 881 (8th Cir. 1922),
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restricted to the allowance of the present value of yearly estimates
covering the probable duration of the plaintiff's life. The court's
reasoning was as follows:
In the business world yearly inventories are made and balances
struck, in profit and loss, in income, and in earnings. The applica-
tion of the present value rule by the jury in making up the amount
of damages to be allowed for the deprivation of pecuniary benefits
arising from probable future earnings is not only just, but feasible.
It is feasible because the jury may from actual past earnings, with
other factors in the problem proven, set opposite each year of the
estimated life the sum which would probably be earned that year
.... These several sums can then be reduced to their present
value. No such process is possible in estimating the amount to be
allowed for pain and suffering, or for pain and inconvenience. In
the matter of pain, suffering, or inconvenience, no books are kept,
no inventories made, no balances struck.
Neither the plaintiff in the case nor any one else in the world
has ever established a standard of value for these ills. The only
proof ever received to guide the jury in detennining the amount
of the allowance they should make is, broadly stated, the nature
and extent of the injury, its effects and results. They are instructed
to allow a reasonable sum as compensation, and in determining
what is reasonable under the evidence to be guided by their obser-
vation, experience and sense of fairness and right. At the best the
allowance is an estimated sum determined by the intelligence and
conscience of the jury, and we are convinced that a jury would be
much more likely to return a just verdict, considering the estimated
life as one single period, than if it should attempt to reach a ver-
dict by dividing the life into yearly periods, setting down yearly
estimates, and then reducing. the estimates to their present value.
The arbitrariness and artificiality of such a method is so apparent
that-to require a jury to apply it would, we think, be an absurd-
ity.24,
It is important to note that the case was decided before the Erie
Doctrine had been established, and it is not clear whether the
eighth circuit was applying Nebraska law or federal common law
in Candler. Since the court cited no Nebraska cases in its decision,
it is probably more correct to assume that federal common law was
applied.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, without expressly citing to
Candler, adopted a line of reasoning similar to that of the court
of appeals when it decided Kepler v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Rail-
way,25 and Culver v. Union Pacific Railroad.2 6 Nebraska, however,
was not the only state to formulate rules prohibiting the discounting
of future pain and suffering awards. Similar rules can also be
24. Id. at 884-85.
25. 111 Neb. 273, 196 N.W. 161 (1923).
26. 112 Neb. 441, 199 N.W. 794 (1924),
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found in a majority of state court opinions including those of Penn-
sylvania,27 Florida,28 Georgia,2 9 Wyoming,30 Nevada,3 1 Alaska,32 and
Oklahoma.3 3 The Georgia decisions are particularly interesting. In
1920, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that it was not erroneous
for the jury to be instructed to reduce all allowances for future
pain and suffering to present cash value.34 However, in 1926, which
interestingly enough was after Candler was decided, the court
changed its position in reliance on Pennsylvania case law and held
that a jury, in a suit where future pain and suffering damages are
sought, should not be instructed to reduce such damages to their
present worth.35 The court has since maintained this latter posi-
tion in numerous cases.3 6 The Florida Supreme Court, in citing
to Candler,37 best summed up the concern of the majority for un-
duly complicating the jury's job of determining pain and suffering
damages by requiring them to also reduce such allowance to its
present cash value when it stated:
Their [the jury's] problem is not one of mathematical calculation
but involves an exercise of their sound judgment of what is fair
and right. The problem is often further complicated by the fact
that the pain and suffering are yet to be suffered and thus even
further removed from exact calculation and certain measurement.
But such further uncertainty does not change the problem from one
of judgment to one of calculation. It still rests within the enlight-
ened conscience of the jury. We think, therefore, that the aspect
of present compensation for future pain is merely one of the sub-
jective elements of the problem, and is not a process of mathe-
matical calculation of present value, such as must be applied to
27. See O'Hara v. Scranton, 342 Pa. 137, 19 A.2d 114 (1941); Yost v. West
Penn Ry., 336 Pa. 407, 9 A.2d 368 (1939); Hunter v. Pope, 289 Pa. 560,
137 A. 731 (1927); Sebastian v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & I., 262 Pa.
510, 105 A. 887 (1919); Ford v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & I., 262 Pa.
514, 105 A. 885 (1919); Bostwick v. Pittsburgh Ry., 255 Pa. 387, 100
A. 123 (1917); McLane v. Pittsburgh Ry., 230 Pa. 29, 79 A. 237 (1911);
Renner v. Senile, 151 Pa. Super. 231, 30 A.2d 220 (1943).
28. Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 80 So. 2d 662, 668 (Fla. 1955).
29. See National Trailer Convoy v. Sutton, 136 Ga. App. 760, 764, 222
S.E.2d 98, 101 (1975); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Dillingham,
112 Ga. App. 422, 424, 145 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1965); Bagley v. Akins,
110 Ga. App. 338, 338, 138 S.E.2d 430, 431 (1964); Louisville & N.R.R.
v. Bean, 49 Ga. App. 4, 8, 174 S.E. 209, 211 (1934); )outhern Ry. v.
Bottoms, 35 Ga. App. 804, 134 S.E. 824, 825 (1926).
30. Borzea v. Anselmi, 71 Wyo. 348, 373-74, 258 P.2d 796, 804 (1952).
31. Porter v. Funkhouser, 79 Nev. 273, 278-79, 382 P.2d 216, 218-19 (1963).
32. Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 676 (Alaska 1967).
33. Bready v. Tipton, 407 P.2d 194, 206 (Okla. 1965).
34. Pidcock v. West, 24 Ga. App. 785, 788-90, 102 S.E. 360, 362 (1920).
35. Southern Ry. v. Bottoms, 35 Ga. App. 804, 804, 134 S.E. 824, 825 (1926).
36. See note 29 supra.
37. Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 80 So. 2d 662, 666 (Fla. 1955),
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periodic future pecuniary losses. We think, as has been said by
others, that to treat future pain and suffering as the loss of an an-
nuity is an absurdity.8
The majority of state courts have not, however, been the only
courts to require that pain and suffering damages not be reduced
to present cash value. A number of federal courts have applied
the rule as well when applying federal law in cases brought under
the Federal Employers Liability Act 39 and admiralty law.40 It is
interesting to note that in refusing to allow pain and suffering dam-
ages to be reduced to present value the majority of the federal
courts rely upon the Candler case as controlling authority.41 In
recent years, only one federal court has allowed damages for future
pain and suffering to be reduced to present value.42 However, the
court later admitted that its decision was erroneous. 48
38. Id. at 668.
39. Taylor v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R., 438 F.2d 351, 353 (10th Cir.
1971); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Buckles, 232 F.2d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 1956);
Sleeman v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 305 F. Supp. 33, 35 (W.D. Mich.
1969) (giving rule cognizance but refusing to apply it at that time
since neither the plaintiff's counsel or the judge was aware of it at
the original trial); Schirra v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 103 F. Supp.
812, 823 (M.D. Pa. 1952).
40. Yodice v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maatschappij, 443
F.2d 76, 77 (2d Cir. 1971); Henderson v. S.C. Loveland Co., 390
F. Supp. 347, 352-53 (N.D. Fla. 1974) (refusing to allow future pain
and suffering to be reduced to present value but allowing defendant
to point out to jury that a payment of monies now was being made
for pain and suffering not to be experienced until the future, particu-
larly where plaintiff has a long life expectancy.); Hanson v. Reiss
Steamship Co., 184 F. Supp. 545, 553 (D. Del. 1960).
41. Taylor v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R., 438 F.2d 351, 353 (10th Cir.
1971); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Buckles, 232 F.2d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 1956);
Sleeman v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 305 F. Supp. 33, 36 ILI (W.D. Mich.
1969); Hanson v. Reiss Steamship Co., 184 F. Supp. 545, 553 (D. Del.
1960).
42. Sleeman v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 290 F. Supp. 817, 825 (W.D. Mich.
1968).
43. The case was subsequently appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit which remanded the case for recomputation
of damages. Sleeman v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R, 414 F.2d 305, 308
(6th Cir. 1969). On remand, the district court refigured the plaintiff's
future earnings as instructed by the sixth circuit and noted that the
defendant had received an additional windfall with respect to damages
for future pain and suffering at the original trial. Sleeman v. Chesa-
peake & Ohio R.R., 305 F. Supp. 33, 36 n.1 (W.D. Mich. 1969). The
district court stated that both it and the plaintiff were unaware at trial
of the line of federal cases holding that an award for future pain and
suffering need not be reduced to present worth. However, because
of this unawareness, the court declined to alter its award for future
pain and suffering at that time. Id,
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In addition to the Candler decision, the federal courts have relied
on the federal jury instructions as being the basis on which to deny
reduction of future pain and suffering damages to present value.44
The history behind these federal jury instructions is intriguing.
The 1965 edition 4 5 stated in relevant part as follows:
If the jury should find that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict,
and further find that the evidence in the case establishes any one
or more of the following items of actual damage: . . .(3) a reason-
able likelihood of future pain or suffering or mental anguish; then
it becomes the duty of the jury to ascertain the present worth in
dollars of such future damage, since the award of future damages
necessarily requires that payment be made now for a loss that will
not actually be sustained until some future date.
45
However, in the recent edition of the instructions, 47 the authors
have deleted the requirement of reducing damages for future pain
and suffering to present value.4 8  In the notes, the authors state
that, "[t]he instruction in the initial edition has been modified to
exclude a requirement of reduction of damages for 'future pain and
suffering,' on the ground that such a requirement is not a part of
the law of most states. '49 In other words, due to the heavy reliance
given by the majority of states to the Candler rationale the fed-
eral jury instructions no longer require a reduction to present value
of future pain and suffering damages.
Despite this tremendous weight of authority and precedent, the
Nebraska Supreme Court in Abbott v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co.,50 made it quite clear that in Nebraska, juries are now to be
instructed to reduce damages for future pain and suffering to pres-
ent value.51 As authority for its decision, the court cited Wolfe
v. Mendel, 52 Zawada v. Anderson,53 and Oberhelman v. Blount 54 A
close examination of these cases, however, creates considerable
doubt in regard to their value as authority for such a holding.
To begin with, the court in Wolfe was confronted with the ques-
tion of whether the trial court had prejudicially erred in failing
to give instructions that damages for loss of future earnings must
44. Taylor v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R., 438 F.2d at 353.
45. W. MATHES & E. DEVITT, FEDERAL JuRY PRAcTIcE Am INsTRUCTIONs
(1965).
46. Id. § 76.12.
47. 2 E. DEvrT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCMONS (2d ed. 1970).
48. Id. § 78.13.
49. Id. § 78.13 note.
50. 197 Neb. 11, 246 N.W.2d 647 (1976).
51. Id. at 16, 246 N.W.2d at 650.
52. 165 Neb. 16, 84 N.W.2d 109 (1957).
53. 181 Neb. 467, 149 N.W.2d 329 (1967).
54. 196 Neb. 42, 241 lN.W.2d 355 (1976).
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be reduced to their present worth.ir In holding that failure to give
such instruction, when not requested, was not prejudicial error, the
court in dicta added, "[w] e think it just as essential that the value
of future pain and suffering be reduced to its present worth as it is
that the value of loss or impairment of future earnings be reduced
to its present worth."56 The court, however, failed to express any
reason why it thought such reduction would be proper. The state-
ment was met by a strong dissent written by Justice Wenke and
joined in by Justice Boslaugh. In noting that the statement was
merely dicta, Justice Wenke stated that it was clearly erroneous
and that there was no Nebraska authority for it. 57 In support of his
opinion he cited the Candler, Kepler, and Culver decisions as being
clear authority that in Nebraska future pain and suffering dam-
ages should not be reduced to present value.58
In Zcwada, the defendants complained that the trial court erred
in failing to instruct the jury to reduce to its present worth any
amount allowed for future pain and suffering.59 The court, citing
Wolfe, stated that "[i] f a defendant does not tender an instruction
proper to the evidence for a present worth recovery of damages,
it is not error for the trial court to fail to instruct thereon."
60 It
is important to note that the court never expressly addressed the
issue of whether future pain and suffering damages should be re-
duced to present worth. Also, the court's language does not infer
that the Wolfe dicta would in fact have been applied even if the
defendant had requested such an instruction.
Finally, in Oberhelman, the plaintiff contended that the trial
court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury that any
award for future pain and suffering should be reduced to present
value.61 The plaintiff relied on the Candler decision for his author-
ity that such damages were not to be discounted. 2  In reply, the
court merely cited to the Wolfe dicta calling for a present value
reduction. and held that it was therefore not prejudicial error for
the trial court to instruct the jury to reduce future pain and suffer-
ing damages to present value.63 Once again, the court failed to
give any rationale to explain why it now felt that a reduction of
future pain and suffering damages was necessary. Instead, in an
55. Wolfe v. Mendel, 165 Neb. 16, 25-26, 84 N.W.2d 109, 115 (1957).
56. Id. at 27, 84 N.W.2d at 115-16.
57. Id. at 32, 84 N.W.2d at 118 (Wenke, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Zawada v. Anderson, 181 Neb. 467, 472, 149 N.W.2d 329, 333 (1967).
60. Id.
61. Oberhelman v. Blount, 196 Neb. 42, 49, 241 N.W.2d 355, 360 (1976).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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attempt to substantiate its reliance on the Wolfe dicta, the court
pointed out that the trial court had properly given the 1969 court-
approved Nebraska Jury Instruction No. 4.13.64 However, this lat-
ter point brought out by the court, when given close inspection,
really does little to substantiate or explain its reason for requiring
the present value reduction for future pain and suffering damages.
In fact, it actually creates more doubt as to why the reduction was
required. The Nebraska Jury Instructions, like the old 1965 edition
of the federal jury instructions,65 require that juries be instructed
to reduce future pain and suffering damages to present value.66
However, the comment following it immediately raises the question,
"[s] hould damages for future pain and suffering be reduced to pres-
ent value?"6 7 This would seem to indicate that the drafters were
not taking a firm position. The comment then lists Candler, Kepler,
and Culver as authority opposed to the reduction to present value.
68
On the other hand, they were only able to list the Wolfe dicta as
being any authority whatsoever for the present value reduction. 69
In light of this, it is unclear why the drafters proceeded to put
the reduction requirement in Nebraska Jury Instruction No. 4.13.
It may have been because they felt that on the basis of Wolfe, it
would only be a matter of time before the Nebraska Supreme Court
would expressly so hold. Regardless of what the true reason was
for drafting the instruction as it was, it is clear that the court's
reference to it in Oberhelman does little to explain why future pain
and suffering damages should now be reduced to present value.
In conclusion, the court in Oberhelman stated: "Juries in Ne-
braska have been 'striking a balance' on future pain and suffering
by reducing it to its present worth for many years. We see no
reason to depart from that rule. '70 But again the court failed to
give any indication why these Nebraska juries, in what must be
unreported lower court decisions, had been requiring the reduction
when the greater weight of Nebraska Supreme Court case law had
been to the contrary. One can only speculate that they had been
doing so on the basis of the 1969 Nebraska Jury Instruction No.
4.13. But as was previously pointed out, that instruction, in itself,
64. NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT COMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INsTRUc-
TIONs, NEBRASKA JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 4.13 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as N.J.I.].
65. W. MATES & E. DEvrrT, supra note 45.
66. N.J.I., supra note 64, No. 4.13.
67. Id. No. 4.13 comment.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 196 Neb. at 49, 241 N.W.2d at 360.
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does little to explain why a reduction of future pain and suffering
damages is now necessary or proper in Nebraska.
The previous review of cases cited by the court in Abbott as
authority for its holding that Nebraska juries should be instructed
to reduce future pain and suffering damages to present value brings
one to a troubling conclusion. Nebraska, a state whose cases played
a major role in establishing a national precedent of not reducing
future pain and suffering damages to present value, has now re-
versed its field and joined the minority view requiring a present
value reduction of such damages without a decision expressly stat-
ing why such a move was necessary or proper. The court in Abbott
conceded that, "[t] he utility of the rule is arguable, but it is one
that everybody can live with if the rule is certain. ' 71 This type
of rationale can hardly be said to be of sufficient weight to justify
a state supreme court from leaving a solid majority view and adopt-
ing a highly questionable minority position.
Although it has never expressly so stated, it is probably safe to
assume that the reason the Nebraska Supreme Court has now
deemed it necessary to reduce future pain and suffering damages
to present value is that it fears it has been unduly penalizing de-
fendants and correspondingly overcompensating plaintiffs in the
past. As the United States Supreme Court has said: "It is self-evi-
dent that a given sum of money in hand is worth more than the
like sum of money payable in the future. '72 Therefore, "the pur-
pose of reduction to present worth is to equalize, as much as possi-
ble, the loss to the defendant and the unwarranted windfall to the
plaintiff arising from the present assessment and payment, in a
lump sum, of future and prospective loss and damage."7 3 Applying
this reasoning to future pain and suffering damages, the theory is
that because the defendant is required to pay a lump sum judgment
when the loss is a prospective one, "[t] he earning power of money
would thus produce an overpayment at the time the prospective loss
actually occurs unless the award had been reduced. '7 4 Damages re-
coverable for torts are those that will reasonably compensate the
plaintiff for the wrong that was inflicted upon him. The Nebraska
Supreme Court's decision in Abbott appears then to be based on the
theory that it would be more reasonable to require damages for fu-
ture pain and suffering to be reduced to present value. "Otherwise
the defendant is unduly and improperly penalized by being required
71. 197 Neb. at 16, 246 N.W.2d at 650.
72. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelley, 241 U.S. 485, 489 (1916).
73. Leasure, How to Prove Reduction to Present Worth, 21 Omo ST. L.J.
204 (1960).
74. Id. at 206.
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to pay a sum worth more than the amount computed by the jury
as necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff as the future loss oc-
curs, and the plaintiff in effect is being overpaid.
' '75
Obviously, the Nebraska Supreme Court's goal is to award the
most accurate and precise damage award possible. The Abbott deci-
sion indicates that the court believes a reduction to present value
will make the award of future pain and suffering damages more ac-
curate and precise for the defendant. The court, however, has ig-
nored certain factors which would make pain and suffering awards
more accurate and precise from the plaintiff's standpoint. If the
jury is now to be instructed to discount pain and suffering awards,
it seems only logical that they should also be instructed to consider
the factors of future inflation and prejudgment interest when mak-
ing their awards. However, as will be seen, the plaintiff's attorney
who requests a Nebraska court to have the jury so instructed stands
little chance of having it carried out.
IV. INFLATION
The Nebraska Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, in applying Nebraska law, have taken a dim view
of requests to instruct the jury to consider future inflation and at-
tempts to introduce expert testimony concerning inflation. In 1955,
the Nebraska Supreme Court in Segebart v. Gregory76 held that:
Juries have the right to take into consideration the purchasing
power of money with respect to commodities that are in use by
the public generally and may reasonably be said to constitute the
necessaries of life .... From that it does not follow that a court
is required to instruct on that subject matter. The value of money
is a representative one. It is fixed by the value of the thing or
things for which it can be exchanged. Whether that value has de-
preciated or appreciated with reference to some other period is not
material. The value of money, i.e. its purchasing power, is ele-
mental within the knowledge and experience of men generally. It
is one of the facts of life which jurors are presumed to know. It
is not error for failure to instruct relative to the purchasing power
of money. It is not a proper subject for an instruction.77
This holding has been recently approved by the court in McClellen
v. Dobberstein.78 Recently, the eighth circuit in Riha v. Jasper
Blackburn Corp.79 was faced with the issue as to whether expert
testimony concerning inflation and its effect on future values was
75. Id. at 207.
76. 160 Neb. 64, 69 N.W.2d 315 (1955).
77. Id. at 68, 69 N.W.2d at 318.
78. 189 Neb. 669, 673, 204 N.W.2d 559, 562 (1973).
79. 516 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975).
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admissible evidence under Nebraska law.80 Noting that it was a
question of first impression before the court,8 ' considerable weight
was accorded the Segebart decision, and on that basis the court con-
cluded that "the Nebraska Supreme Court would also prohibit di-
rect testimony on inflation over a person's life or work expect-
ancy. 81 2 The court acknowledged that both the state and federal
courts were divided on the admissibility of an economist's testimony
concerning the effect of future inflation on the purchasing power
of the dollar.83 It cited McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. Rail-
road8 4 and Sleeman v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway,85 as two leading
decisions excluding such evidence.86 On the other hand, it recog-
nized the much more recent case of Schnebly v. Baker87 for holding
that such evidence be admitted.88 The court further observed 89
that the Sieeman decision had in fact been weakened by the sixth
circuit's later observation that the reference to the exclusion of ex-
pert testimony on inflation was mere dictum,90 and by its recent
opinion in Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Co.,91 where it had
stated in relevant part:
[I]nflation is a fact of life within the common experience of all
jurors. Admittedly, if the jury considers this issue without expert
testimony, their calculations will be even more imprecise. There
is always a chance that the verdict may be too generous. But if
jurors should be prohibited from applying their common knowl-
edge of inflation in reaching a verdict, the party entitled to re-
covery could be grievously under-compensated. The court can
always rectify an exorbitant verdict through its power of remit-
titur.92
However, despite its recognition of a new trend in the United States
to admit expert testimony on inflation, the eighth circuit concluded
that the Bach decision more accurately reflected the rule in Ne-
braska9 3
80. Id. at 843.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 844.
84. 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960).
85. 414 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1969).
86. 516 F.2d at 844.
87. 217 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1974).
88. 516 F.2d at 844.
89. Id. at 844.
90. See Willmore v. Hertz Corp., 437 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1971) (court per-
mitted expert testimony on inflation to be considered by a jury under
Michigan law).
91. 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1974).
92. Id. at 1122.
93. Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d at 845.
922 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 4 (1977)
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity
to decide whether the Riha decision was a proper interpretation of
Nebraska law. Presently then, it appears that in Nebraska, the jury
may not be instructed to consider inflation nor may expert testi-
mony on inflation over a person's life or work expectancy be intro-
duced to aid the jury. Consequently, the only way that inflation
of this type may be considered by a Nebraska jury is if one of the
jurors brings up the issue during the deliberations.
9 4
The Nebraska law in regard to the consideration of inflation,
however, is antiquated and out of touch with economic reality. In
the past, courts universally rejected considerations of future infla-
tion as a factor in computing future loss. An often cited reason for
this rejection was the argument made by Harper and James which
stated in relevant part:
Future trends in the value of money are necessarily unknown and
so always render such damages speculative in a way we cannot
escape. If the estimates represent a straightline projection of pres-
ent living costs, they will be frustrated by fluctuations either way.
If prophecy of change is heeded, frustration will follow if no
change, or the opposite change, occurs. When courts have con-
sciously grappled with the problem they have either found all
prophecy too speculative and so, perforce, have taken the equally
speculative course of betting on a continuance of the status quo;
or they have made intuitive and not always very wise judgments
that present conditions represent a departure from some imagi-
nary norm to which they think we shall rapidly return. It is not
at all clear that courts would be willing to hear experts on the mat-
ter, or that they would get much real help if they did. For the
most part the problem-which is inevitably present in every case
of future loss-is not analyzed and the present value of money is
assumed to be the proper basis.95
At one time, six of the eleven federal circuit courts of appeals fol-
lowed this view.9 6 As was noted by the Riha court,97 one of the
two leading decisions supporting this view is the sixth circuit's hold-
ing in Sleeman v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway.98 In that case, the
plaintiff, Sleeman, had been awarded substantial damages in an ac-
94. See 37 Omo ST. L.J. 138, 146 (1976).
95. 2 E. HARPER & F. JAZmES, THE LAW o TORTS § 25.11 (1956) (footnotes
omitted).
96. Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975); Magill
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 464 F.2d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 1972); Wl-
liams v. United States, 435 F.2d 804, 807 (1st Cir 1970); Sleeman v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 414 F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 1969); Furumizo-
v. United States, 381 F.2d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 1967); McWeeney v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1960).
97. 516 F.2d at 844.
98. 414 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1969).
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tion brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act.9 9 The
court of appeals remanded the case on one issue, namely that the
trier of fact, the district judge, failed to reduce the damages award
to present value.100 In vacating the trial court's judgment, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in effect ruled that inflation
was not to be considered. 10 ' The district judge had not discounted
Sleeman's award for future earning capacity because an expert eco-
nomic witness had previously testified in his court'0 2 that inflation-
ary trends would offset any present worth reduction. In reply to
this, the court of appeals stated that damages in a Federal Employ-
ers Liability Act case were to be decided by federal law.03 It then
stated that federal law, according to Chesapeake & Ohio Railway v.
Kelley,0 4 required that future payments be reduced to their present
value.
0 5
Additionally the court stated that the main case relied upon by
the district judge' 0 6 was "not authority for the offset in this case,
since it has been reversed on other grounds.' 0 7 The court then ex-
pressly discouraged the trial courts in its circuit from exploring
"such speculative influences on future damages as inflation and de-
flation.' I 8 In closing, the court took note of the Harper and James
statement of the prevailing view on inflationary evidence'0 9 and
concluded as follows:
Of course, the nation's economic history since the 1930's would ap-
pear to make the use of present wages as the standard for loss of
'future earnings somewhat unfair to plaintiffs. But as to the future,
the inflation versus deflation debate rages inconclusively at the
highest policy levels of our government, in national electoral cam-
paigns, in learned economic journals and is exemplified in the daily
gyrations of the stock markets. The debate seems unlikely to be
resolved satisfactorily in one personal injury trial. And if testi-
monial resolution of this factor bearing on the future is attempted,
the door is opened to similarly speculative and debatable offsets
tending in other directions.110
99. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
100. 414 F.2d at 307.
101. Id. at 308.
102. Pierce v. New York Cent. R.R., 304 F. Supp. 44, 45-46 (W.D. Mich.
1969); Gowdy v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 733, 752 (W.D. Mich.
1967), rev'd'on other grounds, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1969).
103. 414 F.2d at 307.
104. 241 U.S. 485 (1916).
105. 414 F.2d at 307.
106. Gowdy v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 733 (W.D. Mich. 1967), rev'd
on other grounds, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1969).
107. 414 F.2d at 307-08.
108. Id. at 308.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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The Sleeman decision has, however, been greatly weakened in
recent years. The passage of Harper and James which was cited
by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was taken from the
1956 edition."' If reference is made to the comment in the 1968
supplement 1 2 one finds that, "[a]s James suggests, inflation is not
a temporary phenomenon, nor is it one of recent or uncertain origin.
Inflation is an essential characteristic of a viable money econ-
omy." 3 Furthermore, the decision has been attacked for its im-
proper interpretation of Kelley. It is now felt that the Kelley court
did not intend to set up an inflexible rule for calculating future
damages. Instead the decision merely represents the court's con-
cern for one aspect of the future damages problem and stands as
a holding in favor of accurate compensation for injured parties.
"Kelley does not stand for the view that no allowance should be
made for future inflation. Thus, it seems the Sleeman court of-
fended the spirit of the Kelley reasoning by its blind adherence to
the present value requirement and its failure to make an allowance
for future inflation."" 4 Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, the former voice of the Sleeman doctrine, has since ex-
pressly recognized that the ruling as to consideration of current eco-
nomic trends was dicta.1 5 The court has vacated the application
of the Sleeman decision to state-created causes of action at least in
so far as Michigan is concerned. 1 6
With the weakening of Sleeman, there now exists a growing be-
lief that evidence of future inflation should be considered in deter-
mining future damages. "This is evidenced by three of the six cir-
cuit courts, which previously held that evidence of future inflation
is inadmissible, now modifying their position to hold that such evi-
dence is admissible."" 7 Additionally, the United States Supreme
111. E. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 95.
112. Id. § 25.11 comment nn.8-9 (Supp. 1968).
113. Henderson, Some Recent Decisions on Damages; With Special Refer-
ence to Questions of Inflation and Income Taxes, 40 INs. COUN. J. 423,
430 (July 1973).
114. Comment, Damages for Loss of Future Income: Accounting for In-
flation, 6 U.S.F.L. REv. 311, 319 (1972).
115. Willmore v. Hertz Corp., 437 F.2d 357, 360 (6th Cir. 1971).
116. See id.
117. Comment, Inflation and Future Loss of Earnings, 27 BAYLOR L. REV.
281, 282 (1975). The author lists the three circuits as follows: second
circuit: Perry v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 489 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir.
1974); sixth circuit: Willmore v. Hertz Corp., 437 F.2d 357 (6th Cir.
1971); United States Steel Corp. v. Lamp, 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970)
(holding that proper evaluation of earning capacity would include a
projection of earning history, taking into account all data relevant to
the wage adjustment), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971), rehearing den.,
403 U.S. 940 (1971); ninth circuit: McCauley v. United States, 470
F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1972).
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Court has approved a future damage award based on evidence of
future inflationary wage increases. 118
Many state courts have also decided that projections of future
inflationary trends qualify as valid evidence. The supreme courts
of Oregon, 119 Montana, 1 20 Kansas,1 2 1 and Iowa,122 along with the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals, 23 have all ruled that testimony by
expert economists in regard to future inflation is admissible. Of
particular note is the Iowa case of Schnebly v. Baker 24 which was
cited by the Riha court. 25 The case involved a personal injury suit
brought on behalf of a newborn child against a doctor for medical
malpractice. 126 The trial court awarded $912,124 to the child for se-
vere brain damage, including awards for future care and therapy,
future loss of earning capacity, future pain and suffering, and total
disability.127 On appeal, the defendant assigned as one error the
fact that the trial court did not discount the amounts allowed for
future damages to their present value. 28 Based on the expert testi-
mony of Professor Charles E. Marberry, the trial court had found
that future inflationary increases in price levels would approxi-
mately equal the rate of return on money. 29  Because of this, the
trial court held that the future inflationary increases would offset
the discount rate and therefore no reduction to present value should
be made. 30 In reviewing the decision on appeal, the Iowa Supreme
Court took note of the Sleeman decision rejecting the use of antici-
pated inflation to offset the earning power of money presently
paid.13 ' However, the court held that on the basis of Schmitt v.
Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc. 3 2 the offset was entirely proper in
Iowa. 33 The court concluded as follows:
118. Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156 (1968).
119. Plourd v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 266 Or. 666, 672-79, 513 P.2d
1140, 1144-47 (1973).
120. Resner v. Northern Pac. Ry., 161 Mont. 177, 182-83, 505 P.2d 86, 88-
89 (1973).
121. Hampton v. State Highway Conm'n, 209 Kan. 565, 584, 498 P.2d 236,
252 (1972).
122. Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708, 727-28 (Iowa 1974).
123. Williams v. General Motors Corp., 501 S.W.2d 930, 940 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973).
124. 217 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1974).
125. Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d 840, 844 (8th Cir. 1975).
126. 217 N.W.2d at 716.
127. Id. at 725.
128. Id. at 726.
129. Id. at 727.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 170 N.W.2d 632 (Iowa 1969).
133. 217 N.W.2d at 727-28.
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The judges appear to have agreed, therefore, that future infla-
tion may be considered if shown by the evidence. Future inflation
was shown by the evidence here, and the evidence further showed
that the inflation rate and discount rate would offset each other.
In Schmitt, Professor Marberry increased the future damages by
the rate of inflation and reduced such increased future damages by
the discount rate. Here he testified that such process was unneces-
sary since the two rates were a standoff. Under the two opinions
in the Schmitt case and the evidence in the present case, the process
adopted by the trial court was permissible.
134
The Alaska Supreme Court had carried the consideration of in-
flationary trends one step further. In Beaulieu v. Elliott,3 5 the
court was confronted with the issues of whether future lost wages
and future pain and suffering damages should be reduced to present
value.136 The court, citing Nebraska case law,137 observed that be-
cause money had the power to earn money "it has become the gen-
erally accepted rule that damages awarded for future loss of earn-
ings should be reduced to present worth.' 3 8 Additionally, it noted
that in applying the general rule, the Washington Supreme Court
had stated a formula for reducing awards of future earnings to pres-
ent value which involved the "rate of interest (which) could fairly
be expected from safe investments which a person of ordinary pru-
dence, but without particular financial experience or skill, could
make in that locality." 39 It should be noted that this is practically
a verbatim copy of the formula given in Nebraska Jury Instruction
No. 4.13.140 The Beaulieu court conceded that the formula, "al-
though empirical at best," was probably as definite as one could
be.' 4 ' However, the court rejected its application because it ignored
facts which should not have been ignored. 42 The court concluded
as follows:
Annual inflation at a varying rate is and has been with us for many
years. There is no reason to expect that it will not be with us in
134. Id. at 728.
135. 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967).
136. Id. at 670-72, 676.
137. Borcherding v. Eklund, 156 Neb. 196, 55 N.W.2d 643 (1952).
138. 434 P.2d at 671.
139. Id.
140. The rate of interest to be applied by you in making this deter-
mination [present cash value] should be that rate which in
your judgment is reasonable under all the circumstances, tak-
ing into consideration the prevailing rates of interest in the
area which can reasonably be expected from safe investments
which a person of ordinary prudence, but without particular
financial experience or skill, can make in this locality.
N.J.I., supra note 64, § 4.13.
141. 434 P.2d at 671.
142. Id.
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the future. This rate of depreciation offsets the interest that could
be earned on government bonds and many other "safe" invest-
ments.... Since the plaintiff, through the defendant's fault and
not his own, has been placed in the position of having no assurance
that his award of future earnings, reduced to present value, can
be utilized, so that he will ultimately realize his full earnings, we
believe that justice will best be served by permitting the trier of
fact to compute loss of future earnings without a reduction to pres-
ent value. The plaintiff is more likely to be restored to his orig-
inal condition under the rule we adopt than under the prevailing
rule which calls for a discounting of the award for future earn-
ings.143
As to the issue of whether awards for future pain and suffering
should be reduced to their present worth, the court stated:
The same reasoning [that was applied to future earnings] applies
here as to an award for future pain and suffering. Because of the
annual rate of inflation offsetting dividends or interest that may
be expected on "safe" investments, and of the risk of loss involved
in making other investments, a plaintiff is more likely to be re-
stored to his original condition had defendant not committed his
tort by allowing the plaintiff his award for future pain and suffer-
ing without reduction to present worth.144
Therefore, in Alaska, there is not even any need to introduce expert
testimony as to future inflationary trends. The supreme court has
taken judicial notice of such trends and consequently no longer re-
quires a present value reduction for any type of future damage
award.
This recent dissolution of the traditional holding that future in-
flationary increases are too speculative to serve as a basis for deter-
mining future damages is the result of a growing belief that in es-
tablishing future losses some speculation is inevitable. The neces-
sarily speculative nature of a future inflation projection should not,
however, be allowed to serve as an excuse for making no projection
at all. Every day courts must make speculative predictions when
awarding damages for future losses. "For example, the court must
predict the rate of return that investments will earn in the future,
as well as the injured party's life expectancy, the extent and dura-
tion of his disability and his future medical expenses." 145 Despite
the highly speculative nature of these predictions, courts continue
to estimate the future losses of the injured parties, because it would
be extremely unjust to refuse them future damages simply on the
basis that such damages cannot be established with certainty at
trial. 46 It is obvious that to refuse to grant an injured party any
143. Id.
144. Id. at 676.
145. Comment, supra note 114, at 320.
146. Id. at 320-21.
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allowance for future inflation merely because its rate cannot be es-
tablished with complete certainty is similarly unjust.
147
"By way of contrast, discounting to present value is an economic
and mathematical refinement more fictional and speculative than
an allowance for future inflation.' 148 When discounting an award
speculations must be made as to how and in what investments the
plaintiff will invest. Since people invariably invest their money
differently under changing circumstances, those speculations will
probably be incorrect. Consequently, the prediction as to the in-
vestment potential of the future damage award will be highly fic-
tional. On the other hand, the allowance for future inflation is
dependent only on expert projections of future trends. These esti-
mates of future trends in the cost of living are not merely guesses.
"By considering current government monetary and fiscal policy,
looking at private spending and investment trends, and studying
past changes in the value of the dollar, economists can make rea-
sonable projections of future price trends based on their historical,
statistical and analytical knowledge."'149
In conclusion, the legal and economic principle underlying the
assessment of damages is that the injured party receive compensa-
tion equivalent to his injury.150 When measuring damages caused,
the most accurate possible approximation of loss should be sought.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has evidenced its belief in this theory
with the decision in Abbott requiring a present value reduction of
damages awarded for future pain and suffering. But the ultimate
accuracy and fairness of an award for damages is dependent upon
the extent to which the jury is permitted to evaluate all the factors
which have a significant effect on the calculation of the plaintiff's
losses. It seems only logical that if the Nebraska Supreme Court
is now willing to give the defendant the benefit of reduction to pres-
ent value in regard to damage awards for future pain and suffering,
it should also be willing to allow the plaintiff consideration for fu-
ture inflationary trends which will shrink the purchasing power of
the damages awarded him for his pain and suffering.
Admittedly, the Nebraska case law has not completely prohib-
ited the jury from considering inflationary trends. However, in dis-
allowing requests to instruct the jury on inflation and attempts to
introduce expert testimony on inflation over a person's life or work
expectancy, the present law unduly prejudices the plaintiff. Even
147. Id.
148. Note, Future Inflation and the Undercompensated Plaintiff, 4 Loy. Crr.
L.J. 359, 366 (1973).
149. Comment, supra note 114, at 321.
150. See Bussy v. Donaldson, 4 U.S (4 Dall.) 206 (1800),
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if it is assumed that the jury is aware of past changes in the pur-
chasing power of the dollar, it is unlikely that they will properly
consider them when making their award. If the jury considers the
issue without the aid of instructions or expert testimony, its calcula-
tions will undoubtedly be imprecise.151 The present Nebraska
method of letting the jury grapple with the inflation issue in delib-
erations without the aid of guidelines greatly increases the possibil-
ity that the judgment will be either too small or too large. There-
fore, it would seem to be in the best interests of both the plaintiff
and the defendant to permit expert testimony on the matter at trial
and to expressly instruct the jury to give that testimony as much
weight as it chooses when making the award. "It seems unlikely
that their conclusions will be any less valid from having heard the
testimony . . . and they may be much more correct than other-
wise." 52
V. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
The Nebraska Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, in applying Nebraska law, have taken just as firm
a stance against awarding prejudgment interest in tort claims as
they have in denying expert testimony or instructions on inflation-
ary trends. The supreme court's rule on awarding prejudgment in-
terest was clearly stated in the 1953 case of National Fire Insurance
Co. of Hartford v. Evertson. 158 The decision in pertinent part held:
If a claim for damages is a matter of reasonable controversy, un-
liquidated, incapable of being fixed by computation, and may only
be ascertained by agreement of the parties concerned or by legal
action, recovery of interest may be had only from the date of deter-
mination of the right of recovery and the ascertainment of the
amount.... This court has recognized that in order to recover
interest there must be a determinate amount which could have
been tendered and interest thereby stopped; the amount of the
claim must be known and determined, or readily determinable.154
In October of 1976, the eighth circuit followed the National Fire
ruling when it decided the tort claim in Lienemann v. State Farm
Mutual Auto Fire & Casualty Co.' 55 Since it would be a rare in-
stance when a claim for pain and suffering damages would ever be
a "determinate amount," "liquidated," and capable of "being fixed
151. See text accompanying note 92 supra. The Riha court, citing to Bach,
expressly admitted this fact.
152. Scruggs v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D.
Va. 1970).
153. 157 Neb. 540, 60 N.W.2d 638 (1953).
154. Id. at 543, 60 N.W.2d at 639-40.
155. 540 F.2d 333, 343 (8th Cir. 1976),
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by computation," the present chances of getting prejudgment inter-
est on a pain and suffering damages award in Nebraska'appear slim.
It should be noted, however, that the liquidated-unliquidated
damages distinction used by the Nebraska court is based on the out-
dated "penalty theory" of granting interest. Originally, a number
of jurisdictions used the distinction to decide whether prejudgment
interest should be awarded. It was generally held that such inter-
est should only be allowed on liquidated claims. 156 The theory was
that the "defendant should be penalized for not promptly paying
the amount owed, but it was considered unfair to impose a penalty
for not paying an obligation which was uncertain in amount.'
157
The liquidated-unliquidated distinction has since been repudi-
ated or ignored in many jurisdictions. 58 The rationale has been
that once a verdict liquidates a claim as of a prior date, interest
should be granted from that date. 59 The United States Supreme
Court stated years ago in regard to contract claims that:
It has been recognized that a distinction, in this respect, simply as
between cases of liquidated and unliquidated damages, is not a
sound one. Whether the case is of the one class or the other, the
injured party has suffered a loss which may be regarded as not
fully compensated if he is confined to the amount found to be re-
coverable as of the time of breach and nothing is added for the
delay in obtaining the award of damages. Because of this fact, the
rule with respect to unliquidated claims has been in evolution...
and in the absence of legislation the courts have dealt with the
question of allowing interest according to their conception of the
demands of justice and practicality.' 6 0
So also, a refusal- to allow prejudgment interest on tort claims has
been criticized.' 61 The departures from the liquidated-unliquidated
distinction have become so numerous that it cannot safely be used
as a rule of thumb today. 62 Recent cases have begun to ignore the
distinction and allow prejudgment interest on a claim even though
it is unliquidated if justice and fairness so require.168 Presently the
trend has been to award prejudgment interest on the basis of a pe-
cuniary-nonpecuniary loss distinction.164 The general rule is that
if the loss is pecuniary, 6 5 prejudgment interest should be allowed,
156. See 22 AM. Jur. 2d Damages § 181 n.ll (1965).
157. 15 STAN. L. REv. 107, 107-08 (1962).
158. See Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 337, 345 (1954).
159. See 1 A. SEawicx, DAMAGES § 300 (9th ed. 1912).
160. Funkhouser v. J.B. Preston Co., 290 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1933).
161. See Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 307 A.2d 571 (1973).
162. Emery v. Tilo Roofing Co., 89 N.H. 165, 170, 195 A 409, 412 (1937).
163. See 22 A. JuR. 2d DAMAGES § 181 nn. 18 & 19 (1965).
164. See 15 STAN. L. REv. 107, 108 (1962).
165. See C. McCoRMICK, LAw OF DAMAGES § 56 (1935). An injury is pe-
cuniary where it diminishes the amount or value of plaintiff's property
or impairs his earning capability.
PAIN AND SUFFERING
but if it is nonpecuniary, 66 interest is to be denied.
In rejecting the penalty theory on which the liquidated-unliqui-
dated damages rule rested, the courts have established two new the-
ories to aid them in deciding whether prejudgment interest should
be awarded. The first is the "loss theory" under which it is rea-
soned that the plaintiff, due to the inherent income-producing abil-
ity of money, has suffered additional pecuniary loss because of the
deprivation during the interim of a damage award rightfully due
him.1 67 Therefore, he should be allowed prejudgment interest in
order to make up for the interest on the award that he could have
received had he not been forced to wait for it. The second is the
"unjust enrichment theory" which is based on the premise that a
defendant's liability arises at the time the plaintiff is injured.
168
Consequently, the amount later awarded the plaintiff as damages
is deemed to be his property as of the time of injury, and the trial
is merely, an ex post facto determination of these preexisting
facts.169 Therefore, "[t] o the extent that the defendant has been
free to use the plaintiff's money without having to pay for it, he
has been unjustly enriched."1 70 It follows that prejudgment inter-
est must be granted to the plaintiff, not to penalize the defendant,
but rather to divest him of this unjustified benefit.
Although the loss theory might not support an award of pre-
judgment interest for nonpecuniary loss like pain and suffering, it
would seem that under the unjust enrichment theory such interest
could be justified. The loss theory probably could not be relied on
because the "plaintiff has not, strictly speaking, suffered a loss of
the income-producing element; his financial position has remained
unchanged." 17  However, under the unjust enrichment theory a
more convincing argument can be made that prejudgment interest
should be granted on pain and suffering damage awards:
Arguably, defendant's enrichment has not been unjust where the
loss is nonpecuniary because the money judgment really has little
logical relation to the injury; it is merely a crude attempt to com-
pensate for something which is inherently noncompensable. How-
ever, it seems clear that pecuniary and nonpecuniary injuries have
the same ultimate effect of diminishing human happiness, the
former by destroying the means to obtain it and the latter by de-
stroying the capacity for happiness itself. Thus the distinction is
vitiated and reduced to a mere test of ascertainability, for, although
166. See id. § 57. Examples of nonpecuniary injuries are pain and suffer-
ing, emotional distress, and humiliation and disgrace.
167. See 15 STAx. L. REV. 107, 109 (1962).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 110 (emphasis in original),
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it is difficult to argue that defendant has unjustly had the use of
plaintiff's capacity for happiness, he has unjustly had the use of
the law's compensation therefor. As long as money damages is the
method used by our judicial system to compensate for the diminu-
tion of happiness, it would seem that plaintiff's immediate right to
the money and defendant's unjust enrichment must necessarily fol-
low.172
Reasoning of this type has led one court to conclude that if it is
fair to discount sums paid now on account of future loss which will
not become due until years in the future, then it is by the same
token unfair to deny prejudgment interest when there has been a
delay in discharging that obligation.
173
The allowance of prejudgment interest for pain and suffering
and other nonpecuniary losses would not only prevent unjust en-
richment but would also aid the court process in administering jus-
tice. First, the allowance of such interest would encourage settle-
ments and discourage the use of the slow judicial process to coerce
plaintiffs into accepting poor settlement offers. It is a matter of
common knowledge that insurance companies presently play a ma-
jor role in the administration of tort law. The present Nebraska
view of denying prejudgment interest on pain and suffering dam-
ages encourages insurance companies not to settle until just before
trial, if at all. A simple example may be used to illustrate this
point. Suppose that the insurance company has good reason to be-
lieve that it will owe the plaintiff $500,000 should the case go to
trial. If the plaintiff is willing to settle before suit for $400,000,
then the insurance company from an economic standpoint should
delay the litigation. At nine percent, the simple interest on the le-
gitimate value of plaintiff's claim is $45,000 per year.174 Therefore,
for every year it can delay settlement and litigation, the insurance
company can recoup $45,000 of the amount it stands to lose. But
it is not the insurance companies that are to be faulted. Under the
present system, why should they pay before trial time? The solu-
tion to the problem lies not with the insurance companies but with
the courts. "It would seem . . . that if the courts were to allow
prejudgment interest in tort litigation, insurance companies would
thereby have an incentive to effect reasonable payments in merito-
rious cases rather than seek to advantage themselves of the adver-
sary system."'175 Secondly, the allowance of prejudgment interest
172. Id.
173. See Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583, 594
(2nd Cir. 1961).
174. See Wolf & Evans, A Case for Allowance of Prejudgment Interest in
Reference to Wrongful Death Cases, 17 TRIAL LAw. GumE 302 (1973)
(indepth analysis of the present relationship of insurance companies
and tort litigation).
175. Id. at 314.
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would benefit the public. Not only do the parties have an interest
in the controversy but so does the general public. Delay in the dis-
position of the case has an impact upon other litigants waiting for
their turn to litigate. It also affects the taxpayers who are required
to support the system throughout the delay. Finally, it would
legitimize the unsupervised actions presently taken by juries to give
the plaintiff compensation for his delay. As one court has sum-
marized:
[N]o one would be so naive as to suppose that juries do not throw
into the scales the years that a plaintiff may have had to wait be-
fore his case can be heard by a jury ... It would seem to us
to be better to recognize this and have the computation made on
a basis which is known and understood.176
On the basis of the previous considerations calling for the allow-
ance of prejudgment interest on tort claims, several prejudgment
interest statutes have recently been passed. England, which was
originally responsible for the centuries-old common law rule that
denied prejudgment interest in tort cases, now has a national law
expressly mandating the allowance of prejudgment interest in per-
sonal injury suits.1 7 7 Alaska,178 Colorado, 179 Louisiana, 180 Michi-
176. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583, 594 (2d
Cir. 1961).
177. The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5,
c. 41, § 3 (1) gave any court of record a discretionary power in any
proceedings for the recovery of a debt or damages to:
[O]rder that there shall be included in the sum for which
judgment is given interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the
whole or any part of the debt or damages for the whole or
any part of the period between the date when the cause of
action arose and the date of the judgment ....
However, what was discretionary under the 1934 Act is now manda-
tory, in personal injury cases, under the Administration of Justice Act,
1969, 17 & 18 Eliz. 2. c. 58, § 22. The section adds the following subsec-
tions to § 3 of the 1934 Act:
(1A) Where in any such proceedings as are mentioned in sub-
section (1) of this section judgment is given for a sum which
(apart from interest on damages) exceeds £200 and represents
or includes damages in respect of personal injuries to the
plaintiff or any other person, or in respect of a person's death.
then (without prejudice to the exercise of the power conferred
by that subsection in relation to any part of that sum which
does not represent such damages) the court shall exercise that
power so as to include in that sum interest on those damages
or on such part of them as the court considers appropriate,
unless the court is satisfied that there are special reasons why
no interest should be given in respect of those damages.
178. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.50.280 (1973). The court in State v. Phillips, 470
P.2d 266, 273 (Alaska 1970), interpreted this section to allow prejudg-
ment interest on all damages whether liquidated or unliquidated, pe-
cuniary or nonpecuniary, from the time the cause of action arose.
179. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-101 (1973).
180. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.4203 (West 1968 & Supp. n.10 1977).
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gan,181 New Hampshire,18 2 New York,183 North Dakota, 84 Okla-
homa, 8 5 and Rhode Island'8 6 have all passed statutes allowing pre-
judgment interest of some sort in tort claims. New Jersey, by court
rule, has also allowed prejudgment interest for torts.'
8 7
Nebraska Revised Statute section 45-103 authorizes the allow-
ance of post-judgment interest but does not address the possibility
of granting prejudgment interest. 8 8 It could be argued that section
45-103 nonetheless precludes the court from granting prejudgment
interest, but such reasoning is not sound. The Hawaii Supreme
Court was recently confronted with this preclusion argument when
deciding a tort claim for conversion. 8 9 The Hawaii statute,190
much like section 45-103, allowed interest on any judgment recov-
ered from a Hawaiian court but said nothing about prejudgment in-
terest being awarded. The court concluded that the statute did not
preclude it from allowing prejudgment interest on tort claims
whenever equity demanded. 19' There seems to be no reason why
the Nebraska Supreme Court could not adopt a similar policy with
regard to section 45-103.
In the past it was thought that future pain and suffering dam-
ages were too uncertain to have interest rates applied to them in
order to reduce them to present value. A similar argument applied
to past pain and suffering damages. They too were thought to be
too uncertain to have an interest rate applied to them in order to
181. Mc. Cov P. LAWS § 600.6013 (Micx. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6013 (Calla-
ghan 1962)).
182. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524:1-6 (Supp. 1973).
183. N.Y. Civ. PaAc. LAw § 5001 (a) - (c) (McKinney 1963) (damages to
property).
184. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-04 (1976).
185. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 727 (2) (West Supp. 1976).
186. R.I. GEN. Lkws § 9-21-10 (Supp. 1976).
187. N.J. COURT RULE 4:42-11(b) (1972). See also Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J.
351, 307 A.2d 571 (1973) (holding that the promulgation of the rule
constituted an appropriate exercise of the court's constitutional rule-
making power).
188. NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-103 (Reissue 1974). The statute reads in relevant
part: "Interest on all decrees and judgments for the payment of
money shall be from the date of the rendition thereof at a rate of eight
dollars upon each one hundred dollars annually until the same shall
be paid. .. ."
189. See Lucas v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 51 Haw. 346, 461 P.2d 140
(1969).
190, Haw. Rsv. STAT. § 478-2 (1968). The statute provided: "Interest at
the rate of six per cent a year, and no more, shall be allowed on any
judgment recovered before any court in the State, in any civil suit."
191. 51 Haw. at 350, 461 P.2d at 144.
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calculate any prejudgment interest owing to the plaintiff. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court decision in Abbott, however, now makes it
clear that the court does not feel future pain and suffering awards
are so uncertain that they may not be reduced to present value.
Therefore, it logically follows that past pain and suffering awards
in Nebraska are not so uncertain as to require a denial of prejudg-
ment interest on them to the plaintiff.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in deciding Abbott, has indicated
a desire to make the awarding of pain and suffering damages more
precise and accurate. In requiring that such damages now be re-
duced to their present value, the court has attempted to make the
judgment award more fair and just for defendants. However, the
court has thus far completely ignored the interests of fairness and
justice from the plaintiffs' vantage point. While the defendants are
now given the benefit of reducing the damage award to its present
value, the plaintiffs are still being denied the benefit of inflationary
factors and prejudgment interest. If true precision and accuracy
is the court's goal in awarding pain and suffering damages, these
latter considerations cannot be ignored. The ultimate accuracy and
fairness of any damage award is dependent upon the extent to
which the jury is permitted to evaluate all of the factors which have
a significant effect on the calculation of the plaintiff's losses. The
Nebraska Supreme Court cannot now be heard to deny considera-
tion of inflation and prejudgment interest on the grounds that such
action is required by only a minority of states. In Abbott the court
demonstrated little hesitation in jumping from a strong majority
position to a relatively weak minority view in regard to present
value reduction for future pain and suffering damages. The ques-
tion may arise as to whether the juries, laden with new formulas
for calculating a final damage figure, will arrive at any more pre-
cise or accurate awards than they did back in the 1920's when no
consideration of present value, inflation, or prejudgment interest
was required. No matter what one's personal answer to that ques-
tion might be, the fact remains that the court has now chosen to
require a more statistical and mathematical determination of pain
and suffering damages. In doing so, it should not allow itself to
stop in the middle of the stream. Fairness and justice demand that
the court now require Nebraska juries to also consider future infla-
tion and prejudgment interest when calculating pain and suffering
damage awards.
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